Abstract
Introduction
Luck egalitarianism is an influential theory of distributive justice (Knight and Stemplowska 2011; Lippert-Rasmussen 2009) 
. According to standard luck egalitarianism:
A distribution is just if, and only if, people's comparable positions reflect nothing but their comparable exercises of responsibility (LippertRasmussen 1999) .
By holding inequalities to be just if, and only if, they reflect differential exercises of responsibility luck egalitarianism reconciles a commitment to egalitarianism with a concern for personal responsibility. Elizabeth Anderson has criticized luck egalitarianism for leading to the vulnerability of dependent caretakers (Anderson 1999, 297-300) , because luck egalitarians must refuse to compensate those who are responsible for choosing to care for dependents rather than working a wage-earning job full time. It is in this criticism that we take our starting point.
Taking care of dependents is an example of a costly rescue, where an agent incurs a disadvantage (cost) by preventing disadvantage to others (rescue), for surely the dependent would be disadvantaged if the caretaker chose to work a wage-earning job full time rather than care for her. Call an agent who engages in a costly rescue Benefactor, and an agent, who would have been disadvantaged through no fault of her own if Benefactor had not acted, Victim. The general challenge posed by Anderson's 3 critique is that the dependent caretaker is akin to Benefactor, and luck egalitarianism cannot compensate Benefactor for the cost of her costly rescues. 1 This verdict is counterintuitive and reflects badly on luck egalitarianism as a theory of distributive justice. It is simply not fair that Benefactor is worse off because she engaged in a costly rescue. 2 This paper argues that the problem of costly rescues reveals how standard luck egalitarianism overlooks a morally relevant distinction between responsibility for creating and responsibility for distributing (dis)advantage, and that luck egalitarianism should only be sensitive to the former. An agent is responsible for creating a (dis)advantage if, and only if, she is responsible for behaving in such a way that somebody was (dis)advantaged. An agent is responsible for distributing a (dis)advantage if, and only if, she is responsible for behaving in such a way that X, rather than Y, was (dis)advantaged. Accordingly, we propose the following revision of luck egalitarianism:
The revised principle. A distribution is just if, and only if, people's comparable positions reflect nothing but their comparable responsibility for creating advantages and disadvantages. 3 1 This is not to say that this is the only problem illustrated by the example. 2 The discussion might also be relevant for firefighters, police officers and doctors, who have arguably chosen to work in professions where there is an increased risk of incurring disadvantage while trying to prevent disadvantage to others and which luck egalitarians may also be unable to offer compensation on account of their responsibility for choosing a dangerous line of work. Thus the discussion might also be relevant to the problem of 'occupational discrimination' (Anderson 1999, 296-297) . 3 We offer a complete statement of a revised luck egalitarian principle only to illustrate our proposed revision.
We defend only the viability of the italicized part of the principle which narrows the luck egalitarian focus from 4 We shall argue that the revised principle is able accommodate the intuition that it is unfair that Benefactor is worse off because of rescuing Victim, because Benefactor is not responsible for creating the disadvantage she incurs by rescuing Victim but only for redistributing the disadvantage from Victim to herself. The revised principle can be rooted in a thin underlying moral principle 4 according to which ceteris paribus deserved advantage is good and undeserved disadvantage is bad. 5 Far from being an ad hoc revision in the face of difficult cases the revised principle offers compensation to Benefactor while preserving the responsibility-sensitivity which is the defining trait of luck egalitarianism.
This paper treats luck egalitarianism as an axiological account of distributive justice. A more just distribution is always in one way better than a less just distribution.
There is a pro tanto reason to bring about a more just distribution. The value of distributive justice is grounded in the value of fairness (Cohen 2008, 6-8) . However, fairness is but one moral value among others. 6 Therefore, the reason to promote responsibility tout court to responsibility for creating advantages and disadvantages. We acknowledge that some might find other parts of the statement controversial (i.e. that it is luck egalitarian, rather than all-luck egalitarian (Knight 2013) or that the statement implies that equalities can be unjust (cf. Albertsen and Midtgaard 2014; Segall 2013) . If however, the reader objects to the revised version of luck egalitarianism on grounds unrelated to our proposed revision, we invite the reader to imagine a revised version of her favorite version of luck egalitarianism instead. 4 Cf. (Knight 2009, 171-175) .
5 This is compatible with, but not committed to, a view that advantage should be maximized. 6 We thus endorse Cohen's pluralism about moral value (Cohen 2008, 2-3; Cohen 1989, 910-912; Cohen 2011, 125) , and disagree with Dworkin's monism (Dworkin 2011). 5 distributive justice is not always a decisive reason for action (Cohen 2008, 381) .
Importantly the problem of compensating costly rescues is an egalitarian objection to luck egalitarianism. 7 The prima facie badness of Benefactor being disadvantaged by rescuing Victim is that it is unfair. It is not that the fairness of Benefactor being disadvantaged by rescuing Victim conflicts with some other value. Thus, this objection strikes at the heart of luck egalitarianism as a theory of distributive justice.
One may worry that this axiological approach misses the point of Anderson's objection insofar as her point is not only that luck egalitarianism has counter-intuitive implications, but also that an axiological account of luck egalitarianism fails to capture what distributive justice should be about. According to Anderson just distributions arise from individuals acting 'in accordance with principles that express, embody, and sustain relations of social equality' (Anderson 2010, 2) . While we acknowledge that the case of the dependent caretaker presses several points against luck egalitarianism, we cannot address them all. We do, however, consider it a fair interpretation that it is also meant to raise the point that luck egalitarians must consider some intuitively problematic distributions as just. Indeed this seems to be Anderson's main motivation. Her remark that the disadvantages incurred by dependent caretakers are 'by choice and therefore generates no claims of justice on others' (Anderson 1999, 297) , is precisely criticizing luck egalitarianism for wrongly assessing the resulting distribution as just.
We proceed as follows. Section II argues that luck egalitarianism can offer compensation for disadvantages stemming from costly rescues while remaining responsibility-sensitive by drawing a distinction between responsibility for creating 7 Cohen explores the concept of egalitarian objections (Cohen 1989, 908-912 neither responsible for the fact that somebody, rather than nobody, was hit by the meteorite responsible, nor is she responsible for the fact that she, rather than somebody else, was hit. 9
8 While we focus on luck egalitarianism, our proposed revision is relevant to other responsibility-sensitive theories, such as luck prioritarianism.
9 An agent can be responsible for creating a disadvantage even though she is not responsible for major causal components in how the disadvantage was brought about. If an agent builds her house atop an active volcano, she is responsible for creating the disadvantage she suffers when the volcano erupts even though she is not responsible for the eruption of the volcano. For if she had not build her house atop an active volcano nobody would have been disadvantaged (in this way) by the eruption of the volcano instead of her.
However, cases of costly rescues illustrate that agents can be responsible for distributing a disadvantage to themselves without being responsible for creating it.
Consider:
Brick. A brick is falling towards a crowded street. If no one does anything Victim will be hit by the brick. Victim is not responsible for being about to be hit by the brick, and she cannot do anything to avoid being hit by the brick. However, it is possible to give Victim a push so that she avoids the brick, but anyone doing so will be hit by the brick herself. Knowing this Benefactor pushes Victim out of the way and is hit by the brick herself. 10 In Brick Benefactor is clearly responsible for being hit by the falling brick. We aim to show that it is Benefactor's lack of responsibility for creating the disadvantage she incurs which makes compensating Benefactor required, and that the 11 Brick thus mirrors Anderson's criticism since the dependent caretaker is also engaging in a costly rescue.
12 Note that Anderson attaches importance to the fact that caring for dependents is often morally obligatory in her discussion of why it is problematic that luck egalitarianism cannot offer compensation to dependent caretakers (Anderson 1999, 309) .When costly rescues are not morally obligatory this is either because the cost becomes so high that the costly rescue becomes supererogatory, or because the rescue has morally bad consequence, which outweighs the moral goodness (e.g. Benefactor knows Victim plans to commit a murder tonight).
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cf. (Bou-Habib 2006, 247; Stemplowska 2009, 249; Knight 2015, 122-124; Voigt 2007, 405) revised principle thus not only yields the right judgment in Brick, but will also do so generally, and provides an accurate explanation of why some disadvantages ought to be compensated and others do not. Thus, rather than indicating that distributive justice is not sensitive to exercises of responsibility Brick reveals that there is a morally relevant distinction between responsibility for creating and responsibility for distributing disadvantage and that distributive justice should only be sensitive to the former.
To show this it first needs to be argued that costly rescues possess the features, which make it intuitively compelling that Benefactor ought to be compensated (Locke 2005, 79-87) . The revised principle is compatible with, but not dependent on, the truth of this claim. 15 Cf. (Nozick 1974, 175) 16 Even if it did, one would not own the totality of the ocean but only have a claim to a certain advantage, which corresponds to the advantage one creates by pouring a can of tomato juice into the ocean.
Thereby our proposed revision further amplifies what Cohen emphasized as an important strength of luck egalitarianism, in that it employs some of the most powerful ideas of the anti-egalitarian right in the service of egalitarianism (Cohen 1989, 933 was hit by the second brick. Since ex hypothesi Benefactor is responsible for creating the disadvantage she incurs by being hit by the first brick herself, she is not eligible for compensation.
Apart from being relevant for how much Benefactor should be compensated, it is also worth dwelling on the possibility of being partially responsible for creating the disadvantage one incurs because of its implications for how the revised principle deals with supererogatory costly rescues. According to the revised principle, the distinction between obligatory and supererogatory costly rescues is not relevant to whether Benefactor is entitled to compensation. Some will find this counter-intuitive. 23 However, arguably the distinction only seems to matter because it, to some extent, coincides with absolutely inefficient costly rescues for which it is indeed counterintuitive to (fully) compensate Benefactor. For while engaging in absolutely inefficient costly rescues is sometimes supererogatory, it is never morally obligatory, unless
Benefactor is responsible for Victim being in need of rescue in the first place (in which case Benefactor is generally responsible for creating the disadvantage she incurs independently of the absolute inefficiency of the rescue). Once implicit assumptions about inefficiency are purged from the intuitions about supererogatory costly rescues it seems that compensating Benefactor for disadvantages incurred through supererogatory costly rescues is no different from compensating Benefactor for disadvantages incurred through morally obligatory costly rescues in terms of not imposing net costs on third parties, and it is certainly no less true that Benefactor has done something morally good by rescuing Victim when doing so was supererogatory.
Insofar as it is these two features of costly rescues which makes compensating
Benefactor for the disadvantage she incurs by engaging in a costly rescue of Victim intuitively compelling, Benefactor has just as much of a claim to compensation for supererogatory costly rescues as she has for morally obligatory costly rescues.
This concludes our explication of the revised principle and the main argument for its plausibility. It is important to note that what has been offered is not an objection to luck egalitarianism. The key emphasis is still on holding agents responsible for the consequences of their exercises of responsibility. We have merely pointed to a morally relevant distinction between responsibility for creating (dis)advantage and responsibility for distributing (dis)advantage, and argued that distributive justice should only be sensitive to the former. The revised principle we propose retains the core luck egalitarian emphasis on responsibility-sensitivity. It represents no departure from the claim that a just distribution reflects individual exercises of responsibility. Our development of the revised principle was motivated by, and defended on the background of, the problems posed by those who are disadvantaged as a result of costly rescues. Thus, it is relevant to examine other luck egalitarian proposals which can justify compensating such disadvantages and compare them to our revised principle.
III. Comparison with other accounts
Section II argued that luck egalitarianism can compensate disadvantages incurred as a result of costly rescues while remaining responsibility-sensitive because those who incur such disadvantages are not responsible for creating them. In this section we will argue that the revised principle is preferable to other luck egalitarian proposals which can justify compensating disadvantages incurred by engaging in costly rescues. We discuss proposals inspired by 24 28 Here we set aside the significant misgivings we have about assimilating the performance of morally good actions to the category of 'tastes' (cf. (Anderson 1999, 300 (Dworkin 2002, 83) 
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[…] to allow them to make and carry out plans and projects' (Dworkin 2002, 149) and which is part of any plausible baseline liberty/constraint system according to Dworkin implies that people should not be at liberty to refrain from carrying out morally obligatory costly rescues. Thus, if rescuing Victim is morally obligatory Indifferent is not at liberty not to rescue Victim, and Benefactor seems to be eligible for compensation on the grounds that she can envy the bundle of resources of those who were not hit by a brick, because they were never in a position to rescue Victim and thus were not hit by a brick.
However, a constraint on the freedom to refrain from supererogatory costly rescues would be so demanding that it would itself impede people's ability to make and carry out plans and projects. Far from following form the principle of security such a constraint would conflict with that principle and could not be part of any plausible background liberty/constraint system. Thus, the fact that Benefactor would not be willing to lead the life of Normal, who did not engage in a supererogatory rescue of Victim because of the disadvantage she would incur by doing so, does mean that Benefactor does not envy Normal's bundle of resources even though she prefer Normal's unharmed skull. This makes it difficult for Dworkin to justify compensation for disadvantages incurred as a result of supererogatory costly rescues. This is unlike the revised principle which justifies compensating disadvantages incurred as a result of efficient supererogatory costly rescues. Thus, lack of responsibility for the rescue-situation makes it unfair that
Benefactor is worse off for performing the costly rescue (L. S. Temkin 2008, 143-145) .
As Temkin recognizes Benefactor is still very much free to leave Victim to her fate in rescue-situations, and is thus still responsible for incurring disadvantage by rescuing Victim regardless of whether she is responsible for the rescue-situation itself (L. S.
Temkin 2008, 143). Temkin points out that insofar as Benefactor is not responsible for
the rescue-situation, she is not responsible for being worse off than those who would also have rescued Victim but did not encounter the rescue-situation. This is correct, but does not answer the charge that Benefactor is responsible for being worse off than those who also encountered the rescue-situation but did not rescue Victim. In that case, where two persons face the same rescue-situation and choose differently, Temkin's suggestions offers little in terms of why compensation is required.
In order to maintain that it is unfair that Benefactor is worse off than those who faced the same rescue situation but did not rescue Victim Temkin must ultimately rely on his claim that moral desert is relevant to distributive entitlements which he makes as part of his broader theory of comparative fairness (L. Temkin 2011b, 67) and argue that compensation is warranted because of the moral goodness of rescuing Victim rather than Benefactor's lack of responsibility for the rescue-situation. (Eyal 2006, 6) According to Eyal disadvantages resulting from morally permissible as well as morally good choices are eligible for compensation. Thus, only disadvantages stemming from culpable choices are not eligible for compensation According to us Benefactor is entitled to compensation for disadvantages, which she is not responsible for creating. Though many disadvantages stemming from morally good acts are disadvantages, which those who incur them are not responsible for creating, it is not true of all morally good acts, and it is certainly not true of all morally permissible acts. Thus, the revised principle would deny compensation of many disadvantages for which Eyal would offer compensation.
Since costly rescues are typically not rendered culpable by being inefficient in any of the three ways outlined. 33 egalitarian concern of responsibility-sensitivity, rather than an ad-hoc revision of luck egalitarianism in the face of hard cases.
IV. Objections
In this section we discuss two hard cases for our principle: Costly rescues of people who are responsible for creating the disadvantage they are about to incur and the justice of distributions influenced by gambles proper. Subsequently we deal with a worry about whether the revised principle is action-guiding in an interesting sense.
Rescuing Imprudent
A case where Benefactor rescues someone who, unlike Victim, would have been responsible for creating the disadvantage she would have incurred had Benefactor done nothing may seem like a hard case for the revised principle. Consider:
Imprudent. A brick is falling towards an almost empty street. Imprudent sees the brick falling, but foolishly walks under it anyway. Unless Benefactor pushes Imprudent out of the way Imprudent will be hit by the brick. If Benefactor pushes Imprudent out of the way Benefactor will be hit by the brick. Knowing this
Benefactor pushes Imprudent out of the way.
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Benefactor is no more responsible for creating the disadvantage she incurs in Imprudent than she was in Brick and thus equally entitled to compensation, since Imprudent would not be eligible for compensation had she suffered the disadvantage, this may give rise to worries that the revised principle allows Benefactor to impose net-costs on third parties after all. However, whereas no one is responsible for creating the disadvantage
Benefactor incurs in Brick, Imprudent is responsible for creating the disadvantage
Benefactor incurs in Imprudent. Therefore, it is not the community but Imprudent that should carry the cost of compensating Benefactor for the disadvantage she incurs. If Imprudent does not cover the cost of compensating Benefactor, then Imprudent's distributive share will not match her responsibility for creating disadvantage. Therefore, the revised principle does not commit us to indirectly subsidizing imprudence by compensating Benefactor for rescuing Imprudent, 34 and does not allow Benefactor to impose net-costs on third parties.
The second thing to note is that Benefactor's rescue of imprudent is an example of an action which promotes distributive injustice and is therefore pro tanto impermissible, but which is not impermissible all-things-considered. On the one hand Benefactor does something unjust by preventing the distribution from reflecting Imprudent's responsibility for creating disadvantage. On the other hand, no one can complain that the distribution does not favor them when it is unjust in this particular way (Cohen 2011, 125) . This is so since the only person who is unfairly worse off than 34 In some cases Imprudent will be unable to compensate Benefactor (e.g. because she cannot afford it) and therefore the community will have to pick up the tab. However, this does not mean that the state thereby subsidizes imprudence any more than a state would subsidize criminal assault by compensating victims of criminal assault when the attacker is unable to do so.
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she would be under a just distribution is Benefactor herself. Insofar as Benefactor knowingly brought this distribution around she cannot complain that the distribution is unfair to her. 35 Therefore, the distribution is legitimate, though unjust. Benefactor's rescue of Imprudent can be seen as an exercise of a personal prerogative to sometimes pursue other ends than distributive justice (Cohen 2008, 10; Scheffler 1995) The problem of gambles Gambling may also be thought to create problems for the revised principle. Consider:
The celebrated gamble. Immanuel and Gottfried agree to bet on the outcome of a coin-toss. Immanuel bets his majestic wig that the coin will land heads up.
Gottfried bets his equally magnificent wig that the coin will land tails up. The coin land tails up. Gottfried now owns both wigs.
35 And if Benefactor did not bring the distribution about knowingly she is not responsible for the distribution.
36 Luck egalitarianism must also concede the existence of cases, where the moral value of respecting the wishes of the disadvantaged to not be compensated outweighs the pro tanto reason to further distributive justice (e.g.
compensating people for being physically unattractive) (Cf. (Anderson 1999, 305-306) (Knight 2005) creates distributive injustice does not imply that the results of gambles ought to be undone all-things-considered. In the absence of this implication, the verdict that gambling creates distributive injustice seems intuitive.
Is the revised principle properly action-guiding?
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The revised principle is action-guiding in the sense that it is a principle of distributive justice and there is a pro tanto reason to promote distributive justice. However, our discussion of Imprudent and the celebrated gamble revealed the existence of cases where the reason to promote distributive justice is not decisive. This explained away the prima facie counter-intuitive implications of the revised principle in those cases.
However, dodging the Scylla of counter-intuitive implications in this way may take us too close to the Charybdis of practical irrelevance. One might worry that the connection between the revised principle and decisive reasons for action becomes so loose that the principle fails to be properly action-guiding. After all neither the reason to compensate Benefactor against her will in Imprudent nor the reason to undo the results of the celebrated gamble was decisive.
If this objection is motivated by a general worry that luck egalitarianism fails to be properly action-guiding then our revision will not save luck egalitarianism.
However, our proposed revision will not make luck egalitarianism less action-guiding either. The pro tanto reason to compensate Benefactor is a decisive reason for offering compensation whenever there would have been a decisive reason to compensate someone who was like Benefactor in every way, except that she was not responsible for distributing the disadvantage to herself either according to standard luck egalitarianism.
However, a decisive reason to offer compensation is not a decisive reason to force
Benefactor to take it. Any injustice this causes will only make Benefactor worse off and in those cases the value of respecting Benefactor's freedom outweighs the value of distributive justice. This is what does the work in Imprudent. This is also what does the work in the celebrated gamble though this may be less obvious. Since undoing the result of gambles would make the activity pointless Immanuel and Gottfried can be seen as having refused compensation ex ante by engaging in the activity.
Thus, our treatment of Imprudent and the celebrated gamble does not indicate that the reason promote distributive justice is rarely decisive. There is normally a decisive reason to offer compensation to Benefactor, and in cases like Brick it seems plausible that Benefactor would rarely refuse compensation.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that the reason it is counter-intuitive to deny compensation to those who are disadvantaged as a result of costly rescues, which prevent disadvantage to others, is that these people are not responsible for creating the disadvantage they incur, but only for distributing the disadvantage from others to themselves. Thus the problem posed by costly rescues reveals that standard luck egalitarianism overlooks a morally important distinction between responsibility for creating (dis)advantage and responsibility for distributing (dis)advantage, and that distributive justice should only be sensitive to responsibility for creating (dis)advantages. In light of this we have proposed revising luck egalitarianism in the following manner:
The revised principle. A distribution is just if, and only if, people's comparable positions reflect nothing but their comparable responsibility for creating advantages and disadvantages.
The revised principle can offer compensation for disadvantages incurred as a result of costly rescues while remaining a responsibility-sensitive principle of distributive justice.
We also believe to have shown that the revised principle offers such compensation on firmer ground than the competing alternatives.
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Our proposed adjustment of luck egalitarianism has theoretical importance for two reasons. First, it raises the hitherto overlooked question of whether luck egalitarianism should hold agents responsible for distributing disadvantages, or whether luck egalitarianism should only hold agents responsible for creating disadvantages. Second, our proposed adjustment enables luck egalitarianism to give plausible answers to hard cases raised as objections against luck egalitarianism. Notably, it seems that the revised principle can meet Elizabeth Anderson's objection that luck egalitarianism abandons dependent caretakers (Anderson 1999, 300) . Many of these dependent caretakers will be eligible for compensation, because their disadvantageous choices prevent disadvantage to others. Therefore, they do not create disadvantage, but only distribute it from others to themselves. Interestingly, the vulnerability of dependent caretakers is one of the criticisms against luck egalitarianism that luck egalitarians have been inclined to concede (Knight 2005, 59-62) . We hope to have shown that such a concession is unnecessary, since luck egalitarianism contains the resources to meet this challenge.
The revision of luck egalitarianism which we have proposed in this paper has practical importance as well, since it enables luck egalitarianism to offer compensation to a number of people who prevent disadvantage to others at the risk of suffering a disadvantage themselves. From public servants occupying hazardous jobs for the greater good, like firefighters and police officers, to good Samaritans who help persons in need at their own expense, putting the wellbeing of others above their own.
When these people are hurt in the line of duty, they deserve to be compensated.
Fortunately, luck egalitarianism is well equipped to offer such compensation, pace
Anderson.
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